Politics and governmentality
Barry Hindess
Michel Foucault's studies of the political rationality of modern government have inspired a substantial body of academic work devoted to the analysis of liberal and neo-liberal government in the societies of the modern West. A curious feature of this development is that the Foucaultian study of government has been taken up largely by sociologists and historians while in departments of Government and Political Science Foucault is treated largely as a philosopher or normative theorist who has little to contribute to the substantive analysis of politics.
One reason why these studies have not been taken up in such departments is surely to be found in the intellectually conservative character of political science as a discipline. In this brief comment, however, I want to focus on a reason of a different kind: namely, that this powerful analysis of modern government has little to say about the partisanship which is central to conventional understandings of modern politics. In fact, Foucault rarely uses 'politics', 'political' and related terms to invoke matters of partisan dispute: instead they refer primarily to the work of government. Thus, when he insists, in the closing section of his Tanner Lectures on Human Values, that liberation 'can only come from attacking ... political rationality's very roots' (1981, p. 254) his argument is clearly directed against the political rationality that, in his view, underlies the modern art of government.
The art of government, as Foucault describes it, takes up a version of the classical view that the government of the state has its own proper purpose or telos, that the state should be 'governed according to rational principles which are intrinsic to it' (1991, pp 96-7). Foucault insists that the normative claims of this art of government should be distinguished from two alternative perspectives: justification of rule in terms of a universal order laid down by God (and therefore not intrinsic to the state) and 'the problematic of the Prince', which is primarily concerned with 'the prince's ability to keep his principality' (ibid., p. 90). His point in making these distinctions is not to endorse the classical view of the purpose or telos of government
B quite the contrary, as we have seen B but rather to present the modern government of the state as a systematic attempt to realise that purpose.As he describes it, then, the art of government is concerned not so much with the business of taking over the state, keeping it in one's possession or subordinating it to some external principle of legitimacy but rather with the work of conducting the affairs of the population in the interests of the whole. Government, in this sense, is not restricted to the work of the government and the agencies it controls. Much of it will also be performed by agencies of other kinds, by elements of what is now called civil society: churches, employers, financial institutions, legal and medical professionals, voluntary associations. The work of governing the state as a whole, then, extends far beyond the institutions of the state itself.
The Foucaultian accounts of liberalism and neo-liberalism takes this analysis further by focussing on forms of government that aim, as far as possible, to work through the promotion of certain forms of freedom and arranging conditions so that the resulting activity furthers the common good. Perhaps the most significant contribution of this literature has been its careful exploration of the ways in which this governmental politics extends beyond state agencies to make use of practices of individual self-government and of diverse elements of civil society.
Nevertheless, there are fundamental aspects of politics which this perspective has so far failed to address. One is the politics of resistance that Foucault himself invokes in his normative critique of political reason. For my purposes, however, the more important silence of the governmentality literature concerns the governmental significance of partisan politics.
Partisanship is intrinsic to what Weber describes as politically oriented action, action that is aimed at exerting influence on the government of a political organisation. Action may be 'politically oriented' in this sense without participating in the work of government itself. Where the focus of Foucault's 'political reason' is on the overall pursuit of the interests and the welfare of the state and the population ruled by the state, that of Weber's 'politically oriented action' is on the partisan activities of parties, pressure groups and social movements and, of course, of individuals or factions within them.
In fact, while politically oriented activity may not be directly governmental, the problem of how to deal with it has always been one of the central concerns of governmental reason. We can begin our discussion of this point by observing that the scope for a certain kind of partisanship is already inscribed in the classical view of the purpose or telos of government
B a view which, as Foucault describes it, the modern art of government also adopts. Far from preventing partisanship, the identification of this telos with the common interest (or some equivalent) serves rather to establish the terms in which partisan dispute will be conducted. Thus, in a pattern that will be familiar to political activists of all persuasions, the common interest and more particular, sectional interests are thought to be quite distinct and yet are frequently confused: invocation of the one becomes a standard means of promoting the other and an opponent's appeal to the common interest is readily seen as just another sectional manoeuvre.While the conduct of partisan dispute in such terms will be present under any form of government, we should expect it to flourish where the freedom of members of the subject population is promoted by the predominant rationality of government. In his essay 'Of parties in general', for example, David Hume notes that partisan groups 'rise more easily, and propagate themselves faster in free governments, where they always infect the legislature itself, which alone could be able, by the steady application of rewards and punishments, to eradicate them'. (Essays. pp. 55-6) The most notable feature of this passage is its view of partisan politics as a damaging infection of government that prudential leadership should aim to control. This fear of what partisanship might do to government has been a long-standing feature of governmental reason but, as Hume's comment indicates, it is has a particular resonance for liberal and neo-liberal government.
This point suggests that the characterisation of liberal and related rationalities of government in terms of their emphasis on governing through the decisions of autonomous individuals is seriously incomplete: they are also substantially concerned to defend the proper purposes of government from the impact of partisan politics. It is partly for this reason that secrecy and deliberate misdirection are so commonly employed by even the most liberal of governments. The neo-liberal push of recent decades has taken this defence further by corporatising and privatising various kinds of state activity, insulating central banks from political control and promoting the use of market or contractual relationships between and within government agencies and between those agencies and citizens.
At one level the aim of such devices is to minimise inducements for citizens to engage in politically oriented action by enabling them to pursue their concerns in other ways, notably through contract and the market: the promotion of certain kinds of individual autonomy also serves to inhibit political participation At another, it is to limit the partisan influence of parties, pressure groups and public officials by removing significant areas of public provision from the realm of political decision, and relying instead on suitably organised forms of market interaction. This, of course, is less a reduction in the overall scope of government than a change in the means by which government is exercised: a form of government that works through the administrative apparatuses of the state is displaced in favour of one that works on individuals and organisations through the disciplines imposed by their interactions with others in market and quasi-market regimes. Since this limited dismantling of the administrative apparatuses of the state is itself conducted by partisan politicians and their chosen advisers, those who are not persuaded by the neo-liberal case
B and many of those who are B will see in this procedure ample scope for the pursuit of new forms of partisan advantage.I began by observing that its failure to address the partisan character of modern politics may be one of the reasons why the Foucaultian analysis of government has hardly been taken up in departments of Government and Political Science and I have now suggested that this failure should also be seen as a serious limitation of the Foucaultian treatment of liberal and neo-liberal government. To make this point is not to raise an objection to the governmentality perspective. Rather, it is to show that this perspective has considerably more to offer our understanding of contemporary politics than it has yet been able to deliver.
References
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Foucault, M. (1981). Omnes et Singulatim: Towards a Criticism of 'Political Reason'. In S. McMurrin (Ed.), The Tanner Lectures on Human Values, II (pp. 223-254). Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press.
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Weber, M. (1978). Economy and Society. An outline of interpretive sociology. Berkeley: University of California Press.